Test Your Knowledge
Key Takeaways
- A skill is a reusable bundle of instructions an agent can find, load, and run on its own — and on most platforms it runs with the agent's own filesystem, shell, and credentials
- AST10 is an OWASP Incubator project, not a finished standard: whitepaper v1 went out for public review in August 2026, with v1.0 targeted for Q4 2026
- The malicious payload in a skill is often plain English, not code, which is why traditional scanners miss it (AST08)
- Repository configuration files are execution paths now — cloning a repo can run code before any consent dialog (AST02)
- Each risk maps to OWASP AISVS v1.0 and the CSA MAESTRO 7-layer threat model, with an indirect NIST AI RMF crosswalk
Securing the Skills Your Agent Installs
AI coding agents install skills the way browsers install extensions: from a registry, on a one-line command, often without review. The difference is what a skill gets when it loads. On most platforms today it inherits the agent's filesystem access, its shell, and its credentials, and it starts running before anyone has read what it says.
The OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 (AST10) catalogues the ten risks in that layer. It exists because this stopped being hypothetical: the ClawHub registry became the first AI agent registry to be systematically poisoned at scale, and at peak infection five of the seven most-downloaded skills on it were confirmed malware.
Treat it as current best thinking rather than a settled standard. AST10 is an OWASP Incubator project in active development. Its v1 whitepaper was released for public review in August 2026 and v1.0 is targeted for Q4 2026, so risk titles and ratings can still move before release.
Each of the ten risks below has its own page with attack detail, the incident evidence the project cites, and a mitigation checklist.
How AST10 Relates to the LLM Top 10
These are different layers of the same stack. The AST10 project maps each risk to OWASP AISVS v1.0 and to the Cloud Security Alliance's MAESTRO 7-layer threat model for agentic systems, with an indirect NIST AI RMF crosswalk (NIST's first agent-specific deliverables are not expected until late 2026).
| Question | Covered by |
|---|---|
| What can the model be tricked into saying or doing? | LLM01: Prompt Injection |
| What is the agent as a whole allowed to do? | LLM03: Excessive Agency |
| What is each installed skill allowed to do? | AST03: Over-Privileged Skills |
| Where did the skill come from, and is it what it claims? | AST01, AST04 |
| Can what the skill points at change after review? | AST05: Untrusted External Instructions |
| What contains the damage when a skill turns hostile? | AST06: Weak Isolation |
If you are securing an agent deployment, the LLM Top 10 and AST10 are both in scope. The OWASP LLM Top 10 (2026 edition) →
AST10 Summary
| ID | Risk | Severity | Primary Defense |
|---|---|---|---|
| AST01 | Malicious Skills | Critical | Signature verification, install-time behavioral scanning |
| AST02 | Supply Chain Compromise | Critical | Hash pinning, provenance, treat repo config as code |
| AST03 | Over-Privileged Skills | High | Permission manifests, per-skill scoped credentials |
| AST04 | Insecure Metadata | High | Safe parsers, schema validation, publish-time analysis |
| AST05 | Untrusted External Instructions | High | Hash-pin fetched docs, allowlist domains, audit chains |
| AST06 | Weak Isolation | High | Container isolation by default, syscall confinement |
| AST07 | Update Drift | Medium | Content-hash pinning, signature checks on update |
| AST08 | Poor Scanning | Medium | Scan the prose layer, sandbox detonation |
| AST09 | No Governance | Medium | Central inventory, approval workflow, audit logging |
| AST10 | Cross-Platform Reuse | Medium | Re-validate on port, normalize security metadata |
Severity ratings are the AST10 project's own, as published in its risk index.